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Abstract—Data owners upload large files to cloud storage servers, but
malicious servers may potentially tamper data. To check integrity of
remote data, Proof of Retrievability (PoR) schemes were introduced.
Existing PoR protocols assume that data owners and third-party auditors
are honest and audit only the potentially malicious cloud server to check
integrity of stored data. In this paper we consider a system where any
party may attempt to cheat others and consider collusion cases. We
design a protocol that is secure under such adversarial assumptions
and use blockchain smart contracts to act as mediator in case of dispute
and payment settlement. We use state channels to reduce blockchain
interactions in order to build a practical audit solution. We implement
and evaluate a prototype using Ethereum as the blockchain platform
and show that our scheme has comparable performance.
Index Terms—PoR, Cloud, Storage, Audit, Blockchain, DLT, Privacy
1 INTRODUCTION
R ECENT years have seen enormous amount of data gen-erated and people using multiple devices connected to
the Internet. To cater to the need for accessing data across
devices, cloud storage providers have come up. Similarly,
there has been an increase in Anything-as-a-Service(XaaS)
which needs data to be uploaded and stored on remote
servers. To ensure integrity of uploaded data, Proof-of-
Storage algorithms have been proposed. With publicly ver-
ifiable Proof-of-Retrievability schemes, data owners can po-
tentially outsource this auditing task to third-party auditors
who send challenges to storage servers. The storage servers
compute responses for each challenge and gives a response.
By validating the challenge-response pair, the auditor en-
sures that the stored file is intact and retrievable.
The inherent assumption in the existing PoR schemes is
that the data owner is always honest. The server may be
malicious and try to erase data in an attempt to reduce it’s
cost. The PoR schemes offer guarantees that if the server
responds correctly to the challenge set, then the file is recov-
erable with overwhelming probability. The auditor is trusted
with checking the integrity of the stored data without gain-
ing access to the data itself, but previous studies showed
that the auditor might gain access by carefully selecting the
challenge set it sends to the server, thus acting maliciously.
Also, data owner may refuse payment to server and auditor
in a bid to cut cost and act maliciously.
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Blockchain, a distributed tamper-resistant ledger, has
seen several use cases lately. With smart contract support,
arbitrary logic can be enforced in a distributed manner, even
in the presence of some malicious players. These abilities
are used to make blockchain a trusted party to resolve
disputes. Several works have used blockchain as a judge to
settle disputes among involved parties [1], [2]. Most major
blockchain platforms have an inherent currency which is
used to make meaningful monetary contracts among partic-
ipants.
In this paper we aim to propose a blockchain based
proof-of-storage model and prove its security even if data
owner is corrupted. We study the collusion cases and argue
that our system is secure unless the data owner, auditor and
cloud server together collude and act maliciously. We im-
plement a prototype using a modified version of Ethereum.
We use the inherent currency of the blockchain platform
to model and enforce our incentive structure. To make
minimum blockchain interactions, we use state channels
and perform off-chain transactions. Our experiments show
that our improved system has comparable performance.
Our Contribution
• Propose a blockchain based data audit model, where
the auditor can be a third party.
• Design state channel based audit protocol to mini-
mize blockchain commits.
• Use blockchain based payment to incentivize players
in the system.
• Give provable security guarantees even when parties
collude with one another.
• Implement a prototype on modified Ethereum and
show comparable performance with overhead of
around 6 seconds per audit phase.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
2.1 Notations
We take λ to be the security parameter. An algorithm A(1λ)
is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm when its run-
ning time is polynomial in λ and its output y is a random
variable which depends on the internal coin tosses of A.
A function f : N → R is called negligible in λ if for all
positive integers c and for all sufficiently large λ, we have
f(λ) < 1λc . An element a chosen uniformly at random from
set S is denoted as a R← S . We use a secure digital signature
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algorithm (Gen,Sign,SigVerify), where Gen() is the
key generation algorithm, Sign() is the signing algorithm
and SigVerify() is the signature verification algorithm.
We use a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function H .
2.2 Bilinear Pairings
Definition: Let G1, G2 be two additive cyclic groups of
prime order p, and GT another cyclic group of order p writ-
ten multiplicatively. A pairing is a map e : G1 ×G2 → GT ,
which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Z∗p, ∀P ∈ G1,∀Q ∈ G2 :
e (aP, bQ) = e (P,Q)
ab
where Z∗p = {1 ≤ a ≤ p − 1 : gcd(a, p) = 1} with
group operation of multiplication modulo p.
• Non-Degeneracy: e 6= 1
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e.
A pairing is called symmetric if G1 = G2. When we use
symmetric bilinear pairings, we refer to a map of the form
e : G×G→ GT with group Gs´ support being Zp. [3]
2.3 Proofs of Retrievability
PoR schemes are used to guarantee a client that her up-
loaded data stored with the server is not tampered. It was
first introduced by Juels and Kaliski [4]. In the setup phase,
the client encodes file with erasure codes to get preprocessed
file F , where each block of file mi is an element in Zp.
It computes authenticator tags σi for each block of F and
uploads F to server along with the authenticators. During
audit phase, the client sends random challenges to the server
which acts as the prover and responds with a proof. The
client verifies the proof and the server passes the audit if
the verification goes through.
The correctness of the PoR algorithm ensures that an
honest server always passes an audit, i.e., the challenge-
response pair verification outputs 1. The soundness prop-
erty ensures that F can be retrieved from a server which
passes the audits with non-negligible probability.
There are mainly two types of PoR schemes: privately
verifiable and publicly verifiable. In privately verifiable
schemes, the client herself audits the server, or the auditor
knows secret about the data. In publicly verifiable PoR
schemes, any third party auditor can generate challenges
and verify responses by knowing public parameters of the
client. A PoR scheme is called privacy preserving if the
responses to a challenge does not reveal any knowledge
about the data.
2.4 File Processing and Query Generation
File: A file F is broken into n chunks, where each chunk
is one element of Zp. Let the file be b bits long. We refer to
each file chunk as mi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n = db/ lg pe.
We use chunk and block interchangeably to refer to each
file chunk.
Query: Q = {(i, νi)} be an l-element set, where l is a
system parameter, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and νi ∈ Zp. The verifier
chooses an l-element subset I of [1, n], uniformly at random.
For each i ∈ I , νi R← Zp.
2.5 Shacham Waters Public Verifiability Scheme
We use the Shacham and Waters Compact Proofs of Re-
trievability scheme with public verifiability [5], which uses
symmetric bilinear pairings. Let a user have a key pair
K = (sk, pk) where sk = x ∈ Zp and pk = v = gx ∈ G.
Let u ∈ G be a generator. For file block i, authentica-
tion tag σi = [H(i)umi ]sk. The prover receives the query
Q = {(i, νi)} and sends back σ ←
∏
(i,νi)∈Q σ
νi
i and
µ←∑(i,νi)∈Q νi.mi. The verification equation is :
e(σ, g)
?
= e(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(i)νi .uµ, v) (1)
The scheme has public verifiability because to generate
authentication tags the private key sk is required. On the
other hand, for the proof-of-retrievability protocol, public
key pk is sufficient. In this paper, we refer to this scheme as
Shacham-Waters.
2.6 Privacy Preserving Public Auditing for Secure
Cloud Storage
To achieve strong privacy guarantees, we use Privacy Pre-
serving Public Auditing for Secure Cloud Storage scheme
by Wang et al. [6]. Let H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 : GT → Zp
be hash functions and g be a generator of G2. Let a user
have a key pair K = (sk, pk) where sk = x ∈ Zp and
pk = (v, g, u, e(u, v)) such that v = gx and u R← G1.
For file block i with identifier id R← Zp, authentication tag
σi = [H1(Wi)u
mi ]sk, where Wi = id||i. The prover receives
the query Q = {(i, νi)}. It selects a random element r R← Zp
and calculates R = e(u, v)r along with γ = H2(R). Finally
the prover sends back (µ, σ,R) where σ ← ∏(i,νi)∈Q σνii
and µ← r+γ×(∑(i,νi)∈Q νi.mi). The verification equation
is :
R.e(σγ , g)
?
= e((
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(Wi)
νi)γ .uµ, v) (2)
The scheme is also publicly verifiable like Shacham-Waters
protocol. Additionally, it is privacy preserving. In this paper,
we refer to this scheme as PPSCS.
2.7 Blockchain
Blockchain is a tamper-resistant, append-only distributed
ledger. Apart from acting as a non-repudiable log,
blockchain can host distributed applications and perform
arbitrary functions in the form of smart contracts. First
introduced in Bitcoin [7], it is a hash-linked chain of blocks,
each block potentially containing multiple transactions.
Participating nodes broadcast ledger updates in form of
transactions. While there are various flavours of blockchain
systems present based on the type of consensus protocol
they use, we use a Proof-of-Work(PoW) based blockchain
system. In a blockchain platform following PoW consensus
protocol, special nodes, called miners, form blocks contain-
ing multiple transactions. The miners compete and solve a
hash based challenge and the winner gets to propose the
next block along with getting a mining reward.
Ethereum [8] is one of the most popular blockchain
platforms supporting Turing-complete languages to write
smart contracts. Ether is the cryptocurrency of the Ethereum
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platform and it is used to incentivize computations on
the platform. The contracts are executed inside Ethereum
Virtual Machine(EVM) which is uniform across all nodes,
so as to have same output across the network. The amount
of work done in terms of the number of operations done is
calculated in terms of gas. A user submits transactions along
with ethers to compensate for the work done by miners,
according to the gas price. This acts as a transaction fee for
the miners, and at the same time prevents running bad code
like infinite loops which might harm the miners. Ethereum
has a set of pre-compiled contracts which are codes running
inside the host machine and not inside the EVM. Hence,
the pre-compiled contracts cost less gas. Ethereum is open-
source with an active community and has seen large scale
adoption.
While active research is being performed to lower con-
sensus time in public blockchain systems, traditional PoW
chains need considerable time before a transaction reaches
finality. Hence, it becomes hard to implement multi-commit
protocols which are practical. For example, in Ethereum,
the average block generation time is between 10-19 seconds.
This delay might not be suitable for high frequency applica-
tions. On top of that, for each transaction to get mined, the
user needs to incur additional cost in terms of transaction
fee or gas costs. These problems make protocols like audit
unsuitable as an auditor and server need to interact multi-
ple times to exchange challenges and responses. A typical
technique used to bypass these problems is performing
off-chain transactions by opening state channels between
pairs of users. The participants of a state channel exchange
signed messages and perform on-chain transactions only
when either they are finished with their interaction or some
dispute arises. The blockchain either saves the final states of
the participants or resolves disputes, whichever applicable.
This reduces time and cost for the users.
3 RELATED WORK
On Cloud Storage: The idea of auditing cloud storage
servers was first introduced by Ateniese et al.[9], who
defined Provable Data Posession(PDP) model. Juels and
Kaliski [4] first described a PoR scheme for static data using
sentinels. A similar contruction was provided by Naor et al.
[10] using MAC based authenticators. A study on various
variants of PoR schemes with private verifiability is done
by Dodis et al.[11]. First fully dynamic provable data pos-
session was given by Erway et al.[12]. A secure distributed
cloud storage scheme called HAIL (high-availability and
integrity layer) is proposed by Bowers et al.[13] which at-
tain POR guarantees. Shacham and Waters provided a PoR
construction using BLS signatures, which had both public
and private verifiability. In OPOR[14], the authors define
a formal framework where the auditing task is outsourced
and provide a construction based on Shacham-Waters. Wang
et al. argued that the auditor can retrieve information about
file and hence proposed a privacy preserving data audit
scheme in [6]. For dynamic data, an ORAM based audit
protocol was given in [15]. More efficient protocols were
given in [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. Multiple server based PoR
schemes were formalized in [21]. All these existing work
either assume only the server to be dishonest, or do not
consider the collusion cases between the parties.
On Storage with Blockchain: In recent times, various
blockchain based cloud servers have come up. IPFS[22]
introduced a blockchain based naming and storage system.
Several other systems [23], [24], [25] use the concept of cloud
storage in a decentralized fashion in a P2P network. In [26],
the authors make the storage accountable and show how to
integrate with Bitcoin. In [27], the designers use IPFS and a
cryptocurrency to make a storage based marketplace. They
use Proof of Replication to enforce storage among the peers.
SpaceMint[28] introduced a new cryptocurrency that adapts
proof of space, also proposed a different blockchain format
and transaction types. Moran et al.[29] introduced Proofs of
Space-Time (PoSTs) and implemented a practical protocol
for these proofs. An in-depth analysis of Proof of Replication
mechanisms was done in [30].
While the use of blockchain as an enforcer and incentive
distribution mechanism was tapped in these works, most
work did not consider fairness among the services offered
by the parties.
Data Owner
Auditor
Blockchain
F ,  mi σi
Storage Server
   ↔ (σ, μ)
Fig. 1: Overview of Interactions between Parties
4 PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
In this section we give an overview of the protocol and
outline the deliverables we seek out of it. We also mention
the assumptions on which we model our solution. We use
the blockchain layer as an arbitrator in case of disputes.
Previous works lack the ability to capture faulty behaviour
from all parties because of the absence of an irrefutable
log. Hence, they assumed that auditor is not malicious or
the players are colluding with one another. In our design,
the smart contract hosted on the blockchain acts as an
enforcer of rules. We use the Turing-complete capability
of the blockchain platform to codify the actions in case of
dispute and the native currency of the platform to distribute
and control incentives. The immutability of the blockchain
helps keep log of audit results and provides a transparent
infrastructure without sacrificing on privacy.
4.1 Protocol Phases
We break our protocol into four different phases. Let us
outline the details of each of these phases.
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Phase 0: Initialization Phase
• KeyGen: Initialized by the data owner, this algo-
rithm generates a random public-private key-pair
K = (sk, pk) and public parameters based on the
security parameter λ.
• RegisterOwner: A new data owner uses this func-
tion to setup her account. She deposits prerequi-
site money to initialize her account with, which is
used for future payments. The identity information,
ownerID, will be used to authorize all further trans-
actions by this data owner. She also submits her pub-
lic key pko which is used to verify signed messages
submitted by the owner.
• RegisterServer: An existing data owner uses this
function to supply identity information about the
publicly known server, serverID, and public key
pks of the server with whom she wants to store her
data.
• RegisterAuditor: This function is called by the op-
erative data owner to specify the publicly known
auditor, auditorID, she wants to assign. If the
owner wants the selected auditor to only audit a
particular server, the owner may additionally supply
that information.
Phase 1: Owner - Server
• FileTransfer: The owner divides the file F into
n blocks. Let F = m1,m2, · · · ,mn ∈ Zp. She
generates authentication tags, σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and calculates hash hi = H(mi ‖ σi) for 1 ≤
i ≤ n. She sends (mi, σi),∀i, to the server.
She receives ([h′1, h
′
2, · · ·h′n], t) from server and
checks SigVerify([h′1, h
′
2, · · · , h′n], t, pks) = 1
and hi = h′i(∀i). Then, she sends Sign(([h′1,
h′2, · · · , h′n], t), sko) to the blockchain.
Phase 2: Server - Auditor
• OpenChannel: This function Collects deposit from
server and auditor and opens up a state channel
between them to interact off-chain. It freezes the
owner money to pay necessary parties once channel
is closed.
• GenQuery: This function generates an audit query
for the auditor based on the randomness derived
from the last block of the blockchain. The query is
then sent to the server for response.
• GenResponse: Given a query, this function generates
an audit response. The server sends the response to
the auditor.
• Verify: Given a response, this function verifies
whether the response is correct or not. Based on this
outcome of verification, we proceed with the next set
of challenges.
• CloseChannel: This function receives aggregated
challenge-response along with the complaint, if any.
It verifies whether the queries were valid and re-
sponses pass the audit. In case of complaint, it pun-
ishes the guilty party, else, it pays server and auditor
as per norms of payment.
Phase 3: Owner - Server
• FetchFile: The data owner retrieves the stored file
from the server using this function.
4.2 Security Guarantees and Adversial Model
Security of Protocol
• Authenticity: The authenticity of storage requires
that the cloud server cannot forge a valid proof of
storage corresponding to the challenge setQwithout
storing the challenged chunks and their respective
authentication tags untampered, except with a prob-
ability negligible in λ.
• Extractibility: The extractibility property requires the
FetchFile() function to be able to recover the orig-
inal file when interacting with a prover that correctly
computes responses for non-negligible fraction of the
query space.
• Privacy: The privacy of audit requires the auditor not
to learn any property of the stored file chunks mi.
The auditor generates queries to receive response.
The auditor should not be able to derive mi, for any
i, from the response.
• Fairness: We notice that the cloud server and auditor
offer services in exchange for payment from the
data owner. The fairness property would require the
following :
– If the cloud server stores mi, ∀i, then it re-
ceives adequate incentive. If it fails to keep the
files intact, it gets penalized.
– If the auditor generates queries correctly, ver-
ifies responses and submits aggregated re-
sponse to blockchain, then it receives appro-
priate incentive. If not, it gets penalized.
– If the data owner gets services from cloud
server and auditor as intended, then it has to
pay according to the agreement. If she incurs
losses due to a malicious party, she will be paid
for the damage.
Adversarial Model
Users: We would call a user honest, if she follows
the protocol. Otherwise, we would call her malicious. A
malicious user can deviate arbitrarily.
Adversary: An adversary is a polynomial-time algorithm
that can make any user malicious at any point of time,
subject to some upper bound. Our adversary is dynamic
in nature, that is, it can select its target based on current
configuration of the system. It can make coordinated attacks,
that is, it can control the malicious users and send/receive
messages on their behalf. It can, of course, make a malicious
user isolated and prescribe arbitrary instructions for her to
perform. [31]
However, the adversary cannot break cryptographic
primitives like hash functions or signatures, except with
negligible probability. It cannot interfere with honest users
or their exchanges.
Bounds: The following are the restrictions :
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(a) Flow of the Protocol using Shacham-Waters (b) Generic Data Flow of the Protocol
Fig. 2: Construction Overview
• Among the peers in the blockchain, the adversary
can only corrupt upto the bound of the underly-
ing consensus protocol. For our implementation, we
have PoW and hence the bound is 49%.
• The three parties apart from the blockchain - owner,
server and auditor - cannot be corrupted together. At
most two of the three parties can be malicious at any
point of time.
• We assume that the adversary will not corrupt with-
out sufficient incentive. We think of the adversary as
a rational player in the game.
5 CONSTRUCTION OF AUDIT PROTOCOL USING
BLOCKCHAIN
In this section we outline our construction. For a protocol to
fit into our framework, the PoR scheme has to be publicly
verifiable and needs to produce short aggregated proofs.
Although multiple PoR schemes have our required proper-
ties, we chose Shacham-Waters in our first protocol named
AuB. Shacham-Waters have complete security proofs along
with practical overhead in terms of implementation. Also,
it uses Homomorphic Linear Authenticators (HLA) which
helps us have a very concise proof, which can be submitted
to the ledger for verification upon closing state channel. The
major drawback of Shacham-Waters is that it lacks privacy.
Attacks have been shown that reveals parts of data from
audit proofs. Hence, we further define a privacy preserving
audit using blockchain named PPAuB using PPSCS which
gives privacy guarantees by random masking. We discuss
both the designs in this section.
We assume that the server and auditor are known en-
tities in the system, i.e., their public keys, identities and
addresses are known throughout the system. Also, we as-
sume the server and auditor has some coins deposited in
the system which can be used to penalize them in case of
misbehavior. For simplicity, we assume of a single file F
uploaded by a single owner O to server S. We assume O
authorizes auditor A as the third-party auditor for perform-
ing audits. O might as well act as A herself and perform the
audit protocol. Our security assumptions allow such a case
because the protocol is resilient against collusion by owner
and auditor. We refer to the smart contract hosted on the
blockchain as L.
Additionally, we assume that the payout terms are uni-
form across the system. The terms must contain auditCount
(the minimum number of audit challenges for A), Cs
(money to be paid to honest server) and CA (money to be
paid to honest auditor). All these assumptions can be easily
dropped to extend to multi-user generic setting, but we omit
those cases for brevity.
5.1 Audit using Blockchain (AuB)
As outlined in 4.1, we break our protocol into four phases.
We define each of the functionalities involved in those
phases in this section.
In our Phase 0 (Initialization Phase), O generates the
keys and public parameters using KeyGen_AuB(). It uses
RegisterOwner() to register itself with L and deposit
money (Cs + CA) to the contract. This money is used in
future payment to S and A. It also deposits contract terms
like auditCount into the smart contract for transparency.
RegisterOwner() returns OwnerID which O uses for all
future communication with L. O uses RegisterServer()
and RegisterAuditor() to authorize S and A respec-
tively. If any of the transactions with L fails, the protocol is
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Algorithm 1: Honest Owner
Function KeyGen_AuB(1λ):
Select the group G based on λ.
Select the generators u, g ∈ G.
Select a random element x ∈ Zp Assign sk = x ∈ Zp and pk = gx = v ∈ G.
Return K = (sk, pk), g and u.
end
Function KeyGen_PPAuB(1λ):
Select the groups G1, G2 based on λ.
Select the generator g ∈ G2.
Select random elements x ∈ Zp, u ∈ G1.
Calculate gx = v ∈ G2 Assign sk = x and pk = (v, g, u, e(u, v)).
Return K = (sk, pk).
end
Function FileTransfer_AuB(F, u, sko, n, pks):
Divide the file F into n blocks. Let F = m1,m2, · · · ,mn ∈ Zp.
Generate authentication tags, σi = [H(i)umi ]sk, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Calculate hash hi = H(mi ‖ σi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and store it.
Send (mi, σi),∀i, to the Server.
Receive ([h′1, h
′
2, · · ·h′n], t) from the Server
Check SigVerify([h′1, h
′
2, · · · , h′n], t, pks) = 1 AND hi = h′i(1 ≤ i ≤ n). If not, terminate.
Send Sign(([h′1, h
′
2, · · ·h′n], t), sko) to Blockchain by calling function ReceiveSignedDigest().
end
Function FileTransfer_PPAuB(F, u, sko, n, pks):
Divide the file F into n blocks. Let F = m1,m2, · · · ,mn ∈ Zp.
Generate random fileid ∈ Zp.
Generate Wi = (fileid||i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Generate authentication tags, σi = [H(Wi)umi ]sk, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Calculate hash hi = H(mi ‖ σi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and store it.
Send (mi, σi),∀i, to the Server.
Receive ([h′1, h
′
2, · · ·h′n], t) from the Server
Check SigVerify([h′1, h
′
2, · · · , h′n], t, pks) = 1 AND hi = h′i(1 ≤ i ≤ n). If not, terminate.
Send Sign(([h′1, h
′
2, · · ·h′n], t), sko) to Blockchain by calling function ReceiveSignedDigest().
end
Function FetchFile(F):
Request to the Server to download the file F .
Receive the acknowledgement from the Server.
Download the file F .
end
Function SendCredsToAuditor_AuB(g, u, v, pko):
Send g, u, v, and pko to the Auditor.
Receive the acknowledgement from the Auditor.
end
Function SendCredsToAuditor_PPAuB(pk, fileid, pko):
Send pk, fileid, and pko to the Auditor.
Receive the acknowledgement from the Auditor.
end
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Algorithm 2: Honest Server
Function ReceiveFile(sks):
hashArray = [ ]
for each (mi, σi) received do
hashArray.append(H(mi||σi))
end
Send Sign(hashArray, sks) the Owner.
end
Function SendFile(F):
Send mi, ∀i ∈ [1, n] to the Owner.
end
Function GenResponse_AuB(Q):
σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q σi
νi
µ =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q νimi
Send (σ, µ) to the Auditor.
end
Function GenResponse_PPAuB(Q, firstF lag[, r]):
σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q σi
νi
if firstF lag == 1 then
Generate random element r ∈ Zp
end
Rr = e(u, v)
r
γ = h(Rr)
if firstF lag == 1 then
µ = r + γ ×∑(i,νi)∈Q νimi
else
µ = γ ×∑(i,νi)∈Q νimi
end
Send (Rr, σ, µ) to the Auditor.
end
terminated immediately. This may happen due to multiple
reasons like insufficient funds and banned user attempts.
In Phase 1 (Owner-Server Phase), O uses
FileTransfer_AuB() break file F into chunks and
send file chunks mi to S along with authentication tags
σi. S receives the file chunks using ReceiveFile() and
stores (mi, σi). S sends back signed digest information
to O who countersigns it and sends to L by calling
ReceiveSignedDigest(). In case the digest received
is not duly signed, the contract terminates the execution
of the protocol. O sends the audit credentials to A using
SendCredsToAuditor_AuB(), who receives it using
ReceiveCredsFromOwner_AuB().
In Phase 2 (Server-Auditor Phase), A opens a channel
with S by calling OpenChannel() with L. A then gen-
erates signed queries using GenQuery() and sends it to
S. Upon receiving query set Q, S first checks whether
nonce and previous states are updated. If not, it imme-
diately closes the channel using CloseChannel_AuB().
It also checks whether the query set is duly signed, after
which S generates responses using GenResponse_AuB()
and forwards them to A after signing. A, similarly,
checks nonce and sign before verifying responses using
VerifyResponse_AuB(). If the verification fails, A imme-
diately closes the channel. Otherwise, A closes the channel
after sufficiently many audits.
In case a party calls CloseChannel_AuB() with some
dispute, the other party must respond with proof disputing
the complaint within a specified time, upon which L checks
the complaint and proof and passes verdict. Otherwise, the
complaint is assumed true and the offender is penalized.
We can additionally assume here that only the last query is
disputed by S and A, as for the preious queries the channel
should have been closed earlier. Hence, the smart contract
can only deliberate over the last query and S can only send
the correct response for the last query in case it wants to
prove innocence.
In Phase 3 (Owner-Server Phase), O retrieves the file F
using FetchFile(). S responds using SendFile().
We show that AuB is secure in section 6.
5.2 Privacy Preserving Audit using Blockchain
(PPAuB)
We outline only the differences in the protocol flow from
AuB.
In Phase 0 (Initialization Phase), O generates the keys
and public parameters using KeyGen_PPAuB().
In Phase 1 (Owner-Server Phase), O uses
FileTransfer_PPAuB() to send over the file to
S. Unlike in AuB, the FileTransfer_PPAuB()
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Algorithm 3: Honest Auditor
Function ReceiveCredsFromOwner_AuB():
Receive g, u, and pko from the owner.
Send the acknowledgement to the owner.
end
Function ReceiveCredsFromOwner_PPAuB():
Receive pk, fileid, and pko from the owner.
Send the acknowledgement to the owner.
end
Function GenQuery():
r = GetLastBlockHash().
Select a random set of indices i ∈ [1, n] derived from r.
For each i above, generate a νi.
Send Q = {(i, νi)} to the server.
end
Function VerifyResponse_AuB(R):
Verify whether e(σ, g) ?= e(
∏
(i,νi)∈QH(i)
νiuµ, v). If fails, return 1
Update Qall = Qall ∪Q, σall = σall × σ and µall = µall + µ.
Return 0.
end
Function VerifyResponse_PPAuB(R, fileid):
Generate Wi = (fileid||i) ∀i ∈ Q
Auditor updates Qall = Qall ∪Q, σall = σall × σ and µall = µall + µ.
Verify whether R.e((σall)γ , g) ?= e((
∏
(i,νi)∈QH(Wi)
νi)γ .uµ
all
, v) .
If check fails, return 1, else return 0.
end
uses a file identifier and a different tag generatioon
formula. O sends the audit credentials to A using
SendCredsToAuditor_PPAuB(), who receives it using
ReceiveCredsFromOwner_PPAuB() which additionally
deals with the file identifier.
In Phase 2 (Server-Auditor Phase), both S and
A use CloseChannel_PPAuB() to close the state
channel opened using OpenChannel(). Similarly, S
uses GenResponse_PPAuB() for calculating response to
queries and A uses VerifyResponse_PPAuB() to verify
reeived responses. A thing to note here is that after opening
the channel, S uses firstFlag=1 once to generate the
random number r. On successive calls in the same chan-
nel, it uses firstFlag=0 and supplies r to the function
GenResponse_PPAuB(), thereby reusing the randomness.
µ is also calculated differently in both the cases. Also, A
aggregates the responses and then verifies the aggregated
response in VerifyResponse_PPAuB(). In case of failure,
A closes channel and raises a complaint. S should send a
audit response over the last query in the query set in case
of a complaint, and it should use GenResponse_PPAuB()
with firstFlag=0 to generate the response and send
(R, σ + r,mu) to the smart contract. This is because the
verification equation needs the value r (as before) to pass
the check and without r, the smart contract will punish S
even if the response was correct.
Phase 3 (Owner-Server Phase) remains unaltered.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem: If the underlying audit scheme is secure under Au-
thenticity and Extractibility by a dishonest server, the blockchain
platform is secure against tampering, the hash function is cryp-
tographically secure, and signature scheme is unforgeable, then
no adversary can deny authenticity, extractibility, fairness and
privacy, except with negligible probability, unless the adversary
controls the data owner, server and auditor together.
Proof: We break this proof into six cases, each repre-
senting a combination of malicious actors among the owner,
server and auditor. In case all the parties are honest, we need
not perform audits as each party executes its role perfectly.
We also omit the case where the data owner, storage server
and third-party auditor are all malicious. The proof holds
for both AuB and PPAub and we mention the differences if
and when applicable.
6.1 Case I: Malicious Server
A malicious server may be given to store a file chunk
mi but it may claim to have received m′i(6= mi). This
may happen because of error during communication or
malicious intent by the server. This attack will fail as both
the FileTransfer_AuB() and FileTransfer_PPAuB()
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Algorithm 4: Smart Contracts
Function RegisterOwner(pko, contractTerms):
The Owner Deposits required money according to contractTerms.
Return OwnerID to the Owner.
end
Function RegisterServer(OwnerID, ServerID):
Store the mapping (OwnerID, ServerID)
end
Function RegisterAuditor(OwnerID, AuditorID):
Store the mapping (OwnerID, AuditorID)
end
Function ReceiveSignedDigest((m, t),s):
Require SigVerify((m, t),pks)==1
Require SigVerify((m, t),s, pko)==1
end
Function GetLastBlockHash():
if hb is not set then
Fetch last block header b.
Set hb = H(b).
end
Return hb.
end
Function OpenChannel(id):
Check if id matches stored AuditorID. If not, terminate.
Initialize nonce = 0 and call GetLastBlockHash()
end
Function CloseChannel_AuB(id, complaintFlag, Q′, (σ, µ)):
// Q′ is the query set where each query is signed by A. Let it contain k queries.
Unset hb
If complaintFlag=0, check e(σ, g) ?= e(
∏
(i,νi)∈Q′ H(i)
νiuµ, v). If yes, pay pks and pkA from deposit according
to payment terms. Else, penalize A. Terminate.
If id=ServerID, generate Q from hb and compare element wise with Q′. Also check sign in Q′ using pkA. If sign
check or comparison fails, penalize A. Else, penalize S. Terminate.
If id=AuditorID, check sign in Q′. If sign verifies, check audit equation and make payment. If audit check fails,
penalize Server.
end
Function CloseChannel_PPAuB(id, complaintFlag, Q′, (R, σ, µ), fileid):
Unset hb
Calculate Wi = (fileid||i) ∀i ∈ Q′
If complaintFlag=0, check R.e(σγ , g) ?= e((
∏
(i,νi)∈Q′ H(Wi)
νi)γ .uµ, v). If yes, pay pks and pkA from deposit
according to payment terms. Else, penalize A. Terminate.
If id=ServerID, generate Q from hb and compare element wise with Q′. Also check sign in Q′ using pkA. If sign
check or comparison fails, penalize A. Else, penalize S. Terminate.
If id=AuditorID, check sign in Q′. If sign verifies, check audit equation and make payment. If audit check fails,
penalize Server.
end
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function sends a signed hash hi for each block received. The
owner countersigns on this and sends to the blockchain. If
the server signs a wrong hash value corresponding to m′i,
the owner denies to countersign and hence the attempt fails,
unless the server finds a collision in the hash function which
happens with negligible probability.
The malicious server may delete a data block altogether.
The authenticity property of Shacham-Waters or PPSCS
guarantees that the server will not be able to prove retriev-
ability of the data for non-negligible fraction of query space
with overwhelming probability. Hence the malicious server
will hence be punished.
It can happen that the server indeed receives and keeps
mi but during recovery phase supplies m′i for some i.
The server has no real incentive to do this. We consider
players who do not deviate from protocol without sufficient
incentive.
The privacy property is satisfied as the auditor is honest
in this case and hence the auditor does not attempt to extract
information about F from server.
The smart contract verifies the aggregated
challenge-response in CloseChannel_AuB() or
CloseChannel_PPAuB(). For a malicious server failing
verification, it would penalize the server from the deposit
submitted during OpenChannel(). The smart contract
uses this penalty to pay for damages to the owner. It also
pays the auditor because of correctly performing audits.
Hence, the smart contract ensures fairness, unless its
execution is tampered with, which happens only if majority
peers in the blockchain system are dishonest.
6.2 Case II: Malicious Auditor
The extractibility and authenticity property is preserved in
this case because the server is honest.
A malicious auditor will attempt to compromise the
privacy property by trying to extract information about F
from response set R. In case of AuB, in order to maintain
privacy, the auditor should be prevented from sending more
than (l − 1) audit requests, where l is the query set size.
As server is honest, it will adhere to this regulation and
send complaint to blockchain if auditor deviates. In case of
PPAuB, PPSCS uses random coeffiecients to mask responses
and guarantees prevention of information extraction about
mi.
A malicious auditor may send a query Q to server to re-
ceive the correct response R. It may however store R′(6= R)
as the received response. In the state channel, both parties
maintain common states. The response state will not match
and hence the channel will be closed by the server by calling
CloseChannel_AuB() or CloseChannel_PPAuB(). The
peers can re-audit for the same response which the server
shall pass. The smart contract penalizes the auditor and
hence such an attack fails. The auditor may attempt to not
log the query-response pair altogether. We note that the
query set is public because the source of randomization is
public. Hence, it is not possible to suppress queries without
getting penalized. Clearly, the fairness is ensured here as the
smart contract pays the honest server, penalizes the auditor
from the deposit during OpenChannel() and use that to
reimburse the owner for her loss.
6.3 Case III: Malicious Owner
A malicious owner may supply mi but claim to have sent
m′i( 6= mi). This is safeguarded as signed hash of file is sent
from server to owner who should countersign it and send to
blockchain. Without this transaction, the smart contract does
not proceed with the audit phase. Once countersigned, the
owner cannot deny sending mi, unless she finds a collision
which happens with negligible probability.
Extractibility for a malicious owner is not applicable as
we only ensure that our guarantees hold for honest players.
Authenticity and privacy are guaranteed as the server
and auditor are both honest.
The data owner is the source of the money to the system.
It sends money to honest servers and auditors and hence a
malicious owner may try to deny payment. In our protocol,
money is sent to the smart contract before the start of the
protocol, in RegisterOwner(). Hence, it is not possible
for the owner to deny payments, ensuring fairness.
6.4 Case IV: Malicious Server and Auditor
If both are malicious, they can only collude on the outcome
of challenge-responses. One attack may be the server sub-
mits a wrong response. The auditor consciously ignores a
failed audit. But when the aggregated responses are sub-
mitted to the smart contract, it catches the failed audit and
penalizes the auditor.
Auditor can deliberately skip the audit of a file chunk
i. But, because we derive the randomness from a public
source, the smart contract can verify if the queries were
correctly generated or not. In case of cheating, the audi-
tor gets penalized. Hence extractibility and authenticity is
guaranteed for an honest data owner with all but negligible
probability. In case the server and auditor fail to prove to
the smart contract that audit was performed correctly, they
are penalized and hence the system guarantees fairness for
an honest owner.
As the adversary already controls both server and audi-
tor, it has access to the file. Hence, the privacy property is
not applicable in this case.
6.5 Case V: Malicious Owner and Auditor
Except for the transfer of u, pk from owner to auditor during
phase 1, there is no real interaction between the owner
an the auditor. The parameters are sent through the smart
contract and hence non-repudiation is ensured. The smart
contract handles all the payments to the server. In the audit
phase, there is no owner involvement and hence this case
reduces to that of a malicious auditor. In effect, the owner
and auditor can collude but cannot affect the protocol. The
extractibility and privacy properties are not applicable as
the adversary controls both the owner and auditor. Fairness
for an honest server is assured by the smart contract as it
already freezes owner deposit before start of protocol.
6.6 Case VI: Malicious Owner and Server
A malicious owner and server can only collude to deny pay-
ment to the auditor, thus attacking the fairness property. The
other properties like extractibility, authenticity and privacy
are not applicable in this scenario. In our protocol the smart
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contract handles payment and audit verification. Unless the
adversary controls majority computation in the blockchain
system, it cannot tamper execution and hence fairness for
an honest auditor is guaranteed. 
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALY-
SIS
In this section, we analyze a realistic cloud setting of
blockchain enabled data audit scheme that we have imple-
mented.
7.1 Implementation Setup
We implement and evaluate a prototype using
Ethereum[32] as a blockchain platform. Our entire
code is approximately 1500 lines, consisting of Ethereum
smart contracts written in Solidity language, Go-Ethereum
modifications written in Golang and other experimentation
glue code written in Python and Bash. 1 2
We needed to perform Bilinear Pairing checks for sym-
metric pairing inside Ethereum smart contract, to verify au-
dit responses. In this regard, the original Ethereum platform
does not support pairing based operations on symmetric
groups natively. Post Byzantium, it had introduced pairing
operations on a fixed asymmetric group, in order to support
Zero-Knowledge proof verification. It was impractical to
port some pairing-based cryptography library into Solidity
and hence we modified the Ethereum code to include a
new pre-compiled contract which supported pairing-based
operations. To be specific, the new pre-compiled contract
verified the audit equation given in Eq.1.
We have used the most popular Ethereum implementa-
tion, Go Ethereum also known as geth, which is written
in Golang. For the mathematical operations, we needed
a library which supports arithmetic in Zp, elliptic curve
groups with operations and bilinear pairing computation.
Hence, we used the Golang wrapper [33] of the popular PBC
Library[34]. We included the PBC library inside the geth
code and introduced the pre-compiled contract. We used
Type A pairings which are very fast, but elements take a
lot of space to represent. Because of the modified Ethereum
code, we used a private network for our experimentation.
For the Shacham-Waters audit code implementation, we
used their extended definition with file sectors. As discussed
in algorithm1, we split file F into n blocks m1,m2, ...,mn ∈
Zp. For each block mi, tag σi ∈ G is calculated, where G
is group whose support is Zp. Calculating tags for the main
file F causes a significant overhead if we tag generation
as above. So, we used the concept of sectors as introduced
by Shacham-Waters. Let s be a parameter and each block
consist of s sectors, where |s| ∈ Zp. As there is only one tag
for one block (contains s sectors), tag generation overhead
is reduced by ≈ 1/s if n is large enough.
7.2 Evaluation
We deployed our implementation on a private Ethereum
network consisting of two nodes. We used a single machine
1. https://bit.ly/2L6W55n
2. https://bit.ly/2J0z1Ct
with 4-core Intel Xeon E3− 1200 and 8GB of RAM running
Linux (Manjaro 64-Bit XFCE). The storage server, owner
and auditor codes were running alongside the Ethereum
nodes. The elliptic curve utilized in our experiment is a
supersingular curve, with a base field size 512 bits and
the embedding degree 2. We use different file sizes, starting
from 1KB to 100MB.
Sector size |s|, is 19 Bytes in our construction which is
dependent upon parameters we used for the construction
of elliptic curves. We use 1000 sectors per block in our con-
struction which we noticed is optimized value for current
setup.
The main objective of our prototype implementation
was to observe the overhead in introducing the distributed
computing platform. In particular, we wanted to calculate
latency from each of the parties perspective, i.e., how much
additional time does the owner spend in uploading and
downloading files, the auditor spends in challenge-response
and the server spends on file and audit management. To
observe this, we perform same experiment with and without
the blockchain related calls and look into the latencies in
each case.
Firstly, we look into the latency faced by the owner
during upload of file. In Fig.3, we note that although for
small files the blockchain latency remains considerable, with
increasing file sizes, the commit time becomes negligible
compared to the file upload time. As practical storage
servers store files in order of Gigabytes, the overhead for the
owner is negligible. A thing to note is that the same applies
for the server as well because the owner latency includes the
server signing during file uploads.
In terms of the overhead to the server for proof genera-
tion, the protocol does not demand any additional ledger
interactions and hence we observed no latency from the
servers perspective.
An auditor performs audit over a long period of time.
For example, an auditor may send one query to the server
every hour. It may have to send the aggregated response
to the smart contract only at the end of the day. Hence,
in Fig.5 although we observe a dominant overhead of
blockchain interaction compared to response verification
over 10 queries, we note that the time axis in not an honest
representation of practice where the audit will be performed
over a considerably long period of time as compared to the
commit time.
Overall, in Fig.6, we see that for the owner and server,
our protocol adds minimal overhead. For the auditor, if it is
compared against the span of the entire audit process, the
additional latency remains negligible, given that the auditor
performs the audit over a sufficiently long duration of time.
Table 1 shows the metrics calculated with 5 different
query sizes keeping the file size constant at 1 MB. The gas
cost in USD is calculated at average gas price of 3 gwei and
an exchange rate of 1 ETH = 153 USD. The empty block
size in our private network is 540 bytes. This shows that if
a single audit takes 1400 bytes, 1 MB data on the blockchain
would accommodate roughly 750 audits. We note here
that the block size increase is not linear to the number of
queries as only the aggregated response is submitted to the
blockchain. Each channel session can communicate a large
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number of audits hence in practice, thousands of such audits
can be done with an overhead of few kilobytes.
8 DISCUSSION
We wanted to use blockchain as the source of randomness
for generating query set. As given in [35], for small amounts
of randomness, if the stakes are low enough, the blockchain
can be used as a source of randomness. We believe that
for our audit purposes, the incentive for parties to collude
with miners is low enough. Any other public source of
randomness could have been used. External sources of
randomness have a separate trust assumption and then
we would have needed to consider all the collusion cases
with the random source. Random beacons assume honest
majority unlike commit based randomness protocols, but
both need multiple commits to generate randomness are are
hence slow. Our only requirement is that the peers of the
blockchain network need to have access to the same source
and must access the same random value in order to receive
consensus. We referred a single block hash for each contract
instance, hence the query set for a channel can be derived at
once, after the opening of the channel.
File upload time is very much dependent on number of
sectors per block as well as size of sector. Sector size |s|, is
determined by the parameters and choice of algorithm used
for elliptic curve generation.
We have implemented our pairing check as a new pre-
compiled contract. Hence, the gas required by the contract
has been estimated by us. In a practical situation, either
such a symmetric bilinear pairing support comes baked into
Ethereum, in which case the community decides upon the
gas cost, or, a private network is setup among interested
parties where they themselves decide upon the gas require-
ment. The asymmetric pairing check pre-compiled contract
takes 80000 ∗ k + 100000 as the gas (k is the number of
points on the curve). Upon using similar calculation, our
audit check transaction took 888387 gas. We have not used
this in our performance metric as we think this will depend
upon the platform.
The channel closing codes written in our contract is
far from ideal. It does not take into account all possible
corner cases, but arbitrary complicated code could have
been implemented based on the requirements. We have just
showed a sample code for the prototype.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a blockchain based privacy
preserving audit protocol which is resilient even when any
two out of the data owner, storage server and auditor is
malicious. We used state channels to minimize blockchain
commits thereby improving efficiency. Through smart con-
tracts, we enforced the incentive mechanism in the system.
We also build a prototype on modified Ethereum and show
that the protocol incurs minimal overhead compared to
existing PoR scheme.
In terms of future work, we wish to explore possibilities
to enhance efficiency of the protocol by using other elliptic
curves. We also aim to adopt an audit protocol without
bilinear pairing operations so that it can be readily deployed
on blockchain platforms like Ethereum, without modifying
the codebase. This would enable us to test on networks
beyond a private network, like testnets and main network.
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